Malaria in American Troops in World War II The American army had last dealt with malaria during a war in its campaigns in the Philippines at the beginning of the twentieth century.2 In the United States, malaria had gradually disappeared except for vivax malaria3 in some areas of the rural South.4 The comments of Perrin Long, an experienced infectious disease and tropical medicine expert from Johns Hopkins, are worth citing. "The majority of physicians entering the Armed Forces had had practically no experience in the diagnosis or treatment of malaria. The average younger American physician, except in certain rural areas in the Southern United States, hardly gave a thought to malaria and was unconcerned about his lack of knowledge of this disease".5 In short, few American physicians had any experience with the disease, even those in the regular army.
Bataan
The great disaster of American armies in the Philippines in early 1942 was due in part to General Douglas MacArthur's last minute change in operations that led to the previously planned but now hastily extemporized retreat to Bataan.6 That peninsula was known to be a major reservoir of malaria. The Philippines were estimated to have one to two million cases at all times. Incomplete data, for 1938 recorded 76,193 new cases with 9,427 deaths.7 On Bataan, quinine was in short supply and used only for treatment; the nature of the terrain prevented the application of mosquito control measures, and command direction of personnel protection was not enforced. Malaria and dysentery, coupled with starvation and lack of supplies and reinforcements, led to the inevitable surrender on 9 April 1942 of a sick and starving army deprived of the bare necessities required for survival, to say nothing of combat.8 2 Mary C Gillett, The Army Medical Department, 1865-1917, Washington, DC, Center of Military History, USGPO, 1995, pp. 201-20. 3 There are four Plasmodium species of clinical interest; of these only two-vivax (relatively benign) and falciparum (relatively malignant)-are of major importance. Drug resistance has become more and more common infalciparum, less so in vivax. Both are transmitted by various species of the female Anopheline mosquito. For further detail see, Mary Pudney, 'Antimalarials: from quinine to atovaquone', in P A Hunter, G K Darby and N J Russell (eds), Fifty years of antimicrobials: past perspectives and future trends, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 229-47 . For a general discussion of malaria, see G Thomas Strickland, 'Malaria', in G Thomas Strickland (ed.), Tropical medicine, Philadelphia, W B Saunders, 1991, pp. 586-617. 4 Erwin H Ackerknecht, Malaria in the upper Mississippi valley, 1760 -1900 , Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1945 ; Ernest C Faust, 'Clinical and public health aspects of malaria in the United States from a historical perspective', Am. J. Trop. Med., 1945, 25: 185-201 . 5 MacArthur had escaped to Australia in March of 1942 and had assumed command of allied forces in the Southwest Pacific Area. The Japanese made four attempts to seize Port Moresby on the southern coast of New Guinea for use as a staging base to stop the flow of American forces to Australia. Two American-Japanese naval battles, Coral Sea (4-8 May, which stopped the amphibious invasion of Moresby) and Midway (4 June, which severely damaged Japanese carrier strength), and two land battles-at Milne Bay (August) and at Imita Ridge (September)-found the Australian Army victorious, although severely assailed by malaria, which also crippled the Japanese attackers.9
Papua New Guinea Allied operations moved to the offensive in New Guinea in October and November 1942, with the objective of taking Buna-Gona on the north coast, then capturing or building airfields by a series of amphibious landings to the northwest in Papua New Guinea to secure bases for the return to the Philippines. American and Australian troops moved from Port Moresby by sea and air and overland across the Owen Stanley mountains.
The battle was a "near-run thing" for the Americans. An untrained division, incompetent and unskilled leadership, bad intelligence, and jungle-wise and dug-in Japanese defenders all presented obstacles that were barely overcome.10 The battle was fought in a malaria hyper-endemic area. While there can only be estimates of the prevalence of malaria in New Guinea, spleen rates ranged from 25 per cent to 100 per cent, and 15 per cent of non-native hospital admissions were for malaria. I 1 The allied force was nearly destroyed by the disease. MacArthur was desperate (he had already announced an immediate victory and the TORCH landings in North Africa were getting the publicity). He sent Lieutenant General Robert L Eichelberger to Buna with an order "to take Buna or not come back alive". At Buna, Eichelberger found an undisciplined, defeated, dispirited, and sick division. The 200-man rifle companies were down to 65 men, and all were febrile. He relieved officers, inspired the troops, reorganized the battle, worked more closely with the Australians, invigorated the logistics system, and by January 1943 had defeated the starving, malaria-ridden Japanese defenders.12
The disease costs of those months of early combat in Papua New Guinea are vividly illustrated in Table 1 . Japanese losses due to malaria are difficult to quantify. There is some evidence that at Buna about 45 per cent of their malaria cases died, perhaps 55 per cent of their wounded, and "an astonishing 60% of their patients with dysentery and enteritis" died.13 Captured Japanese documents permit some comparison with American Malaria in American Troops in World War II Once again, the choice of a battle area was in malaria hyper-endemic terrain. As in New Guinea, the prevalence of malaria before the war can only be estimated. In Guadalcanal spleen rates averaged about 80 per cent and between 10 and 20 per cent of hospital admissions were for malaria.16 Malaria was the single most serious and common cause of morbidity. By November over 12 per cent of the marine division was ineffective from malaria, soon with a rate of over 1500/1000/year. Major General Alexander Vandegrift, the division commander, issued an "informal" order that no Marine would be excused from the line or patrol unless his temperature was greater than 103oF.17
The Japanese finally evacuated the island in early February 1943; except for mopping up holdout survivors, Guadalcanal had been taken. Japanese losses to malaria are again difficult to quantify. On Guadalcanal, their logistic system collapsed and the troops starved. By the time they evacuated the island, about 65 per cent of their total estimated force (33,600-44,000) was dead. USGPO, 1948, vol. I, pp. 827-40. 3 Ibid., pp. 392-6.
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The survey unit determined the malaria species present, defined the predominant vectors, assessed the malaria rates in native populations, and did troop and command education. The control unit directed the drainage, oiling, spraying and other destruction of breeding sites, and trained the labour gangs. A typical organization is given in Table 2 .
Personnel training and the assembly of equipment and supplies were complete by January 1943, and the units began to be shipped to both theatres. Table 3 illustrates the build up of units in SWPA and SOPAC.34 Control of the mosquito vectors in non-combat areas was done by drainage and ditching to remove breeding sites, by oiling such sites to kill larvae and by the use of bed nets and screening. Base and airfield sites were located away from native villages, to avoid them as reservoirs. In a few cases, the villages were moved if the combat units could be placed at a sufficient distance. These were all well established techniques used for years. There were three new technologies introduced in World War II-DDT, the "bug bomb", and DEET insect repellent.
DDT (Dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane) Repellent testing of new compounds began in 1941 at the Army's request at the USDA Orlando laboratory with screening of new compounds from industrial and academic laboratories. Over 7,000 compounds and mixtures were screened. The final product sent to the field was a mixture of dimethyl phthalate (DEET), Rutgers 612 and Induline. There were (and are) two problems with a repellent applied to the skin-sweating it off and customer acceptance of an oily mixture. There is no way to evaluate the impact of skin repellents-or even their use.39
Malaria in American Troops in World War II The build up of malaria control organizations during the war. It is obvious that environmental control could not be performed in forward combat areas (including the use of bed nets). Even with clothing discipline, hands and faces were exposed, and repellent, even if used, was rapidly removed in the sweat. A prophylactic/suppressive drug was absolutely necessary for protection against malaria. Thus, the requirement was to examine prophylactic drug use and select the right drugs in the right doses and the correct times of administration. Quinine was used, when available, at Bataan, and initially at Buna and Guadalcanal. However, the Japanese conquest of Java meant that the source of 95 per cent of the world's quinine was no longer available. Further, prophylactic quinine had never been particularly successful in Asian hyperendemic areas in heavily infected people-which was the military problem. Atabrine (mepacrine, quinacrine) and plasmoquine had been synthesized by German chemists from 1925 to 1932, as part of a programme begun after World War I during which Germany had been cut off from international sources of quinine.40 Atabrine had been tested in 1938 by American army investigators in soldiers in Panama for treatment.4' It had been found superior to quinine but had a side effect of turning the skin yellow and there were reports of gastrointestinal symptoms. As a prophylactic it had not been used for longer than a month, and the dosage and frequency had varied with each trial in studies conducted in 1934.42 As new trials of atabrine began in 1942, there was concern that American and British manufacturing processes contained a toxic fraction not in the German product. (The Germans had not specified all the steps in their synthesis of the drug.) This was soon found not to be true, and clinical research began to study the dosage and timing of the use of the drug.43
Atabrine was administered sporadically on Guadalcanal and Buna in December 1942. There was no published doctrine for its use, nor any information on side effects. The unit medical officers thus invented their own programmes. These ranged from the daily use of 0.1 gramme to twice a week administration of 0.2 grammes, to 0.05 grammes for 5 days with 2 days of "rest". If a unit medical officer was successful with a particular regimen, in 1942 and early 1943 there was no system for reporting the data.44
Clearly, order needed to be established and hard data secured. In the United States, the Office of Scientific Research and Development supported studies in volunteers in prisons and among conscientious objectors.45 There was close co-ordination with elegant human trials done by Fairley at a research centre in Cairns, Australia. Here experimental malaria was transmitted to soldier volunteers by mosquito and by blood transfusion. Atabrine and other drugs were tested in varying protocols and volunteers were stressed by hard work to examine drug effect on possible breakthrough of symptoms while on drug prophylaxis.46 The American research was another of the new government-academia-industry consortia that had developed during the war. The malaria programme was exceptionally successful, especially in co-ordinating with international research programmes in Australia and Great Britain.47
The data from the co-ordinated programmes, primarily Fairley's conclusions (turned into Combined Advisory Committee directives in mid-1943), standardized the dose of atabrine at 0.1 gramme a day, with a one week "primer" before entering a malarial area. It was discovered that the dangerous falciparum was suppressed and, if atabrine was continued after leaving a malarial area, eradicated from the body, resulting in a cure. 40 Pudney, op. cit., note 3 above.
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Further, atabrine eliminated the sexual forms of falciparum (these are taken up by the mosquito bite and perpetuate the cycle, see note 3). Thus troops would not be reservoirs of infection for this species.48
The story was different with vivax. Atabrine would also suppress this form of malaria while the drug was taken, but it would not eliminate the organism. This was discovered when troops were removed from Guadalcanal, sent to non-malarial islands and suppressive atabrine withdrawn, ". . . in the hope of demalarializing [the division]. The theory was that if the troops were allowed to have their malaria, they would get it out of their system. . . ". For example, the US Army Americal Division replaced the marines on Guadalcanal in early December 1942. Malaria discipline was poor to absent and the malaria rate was around 1,300/1000. The division was sent to Fiji, a non-malarious island, in March 1943, and atabrine was stopped. It was a disaster-the division came down en masse with vivax-by August the malaria rate was 3,700/1000/year and still at 2,800/1000 in October. Atabrine was begun in November-by January 1944 the rate was 43/1000. The division learned its lesson; in 5 months of combat on Bougainville the rate averaged 112/month.49 In fairness to the medical staff, although a liver phase in avian malaria had been documented, it was not then known that vivax had a phase in man where it stayed in the liver and was not susceptible to drugs. This was suspected, but not proved until 1948.50
The first Marine Division after leaving Guadalcanal, and the US Army 32nd Division after withdrawal from Buna had similar experiences. These divisions were useless for combat for up to six months.51 It was these data that led General MacArthur to make his comment to Colonel Russell in May 1943.
The treatment of relapsed vivax malaria was not easily addressed. The sulfonamides, penicillin, and heavy metals were tried without success. Quinine was indifferently useful, while plasmochin (pamaquine) and totaquine and other cinchona alkaloids were of limited benefit. Long-term administration-for months-of atabrine prophylaxis appeared to offer the best results in patients with relapsed vivax. Atabrine was not without toxicity, although the incidence of side effects was quite low. The skin did turn yellow. An uncommon atabrine dermatitis complex (lichen planus) and a rare case of toxic psychosis did occur. All these signs and symptoms cleared on discontinuance of the drug.52
The research programmes in the United States eventually validated early German work on chloroquine for treatment and prophylaxis53 and developed the drug primaquine, still useful to eradicate the liver phase of vivax and thus prevent relapses.54 But during the war the only answer to vivax was continuous administration of atabrine. Millions of tablets were shipped-hundreds of thousands of pounds of the drug.
Conclusions
Did all these command directions, research programmes and control efforts eventually work? In a word-yes. For the SWPA, for example, the malaria rate at Milne Bay in New Guinea in January 1943 was 3,300/1000/year; in January of 1944 it was 31/1000. For the entire command the February rate of 794/1000 had fallen to 179/1000 179/ in February 1944 For the remainder of the war malaria rates would increase modestly during active combat, but never reached the disastrous levels of 1942 and 1943.
The major benefit of malaria control was, of course, the preservation of the health and lives of the soldiers and marines, permitting the prosecution of the war. Economically, the logistical and personnel support for hospital beds was markedly reduced. In the SWPA, intensive atabrine treatment reduced hospital stays from 15 to 6 days per patient. This reduction, coupled with the overall reduction in attack rates, forestalled the need for about an additional 10,000 hospital beds.56 The force multiplier of healthy troops kept in the line certainly hastened the defeat of the malaria ridden Japanese57 (see Table 4 ). But the 
